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INSTITUTIONAL REFORM UNDER THE SINGLE
EUROPEAN ACT
Kathryn Good*
INTRODUCTION
The Single European Act (Single Act)' is a treaty through which the
European Community (Community) seeks to achieve European unity.2
The Single Act entered into force on July 1, 1987. 3 In addition to
amending and complementing the three treaties composing the Com-
munity,' it introduces new treaty provisions regarding European coop-
* J.D. Candidate, 1988, The Washington College of Law, The American University.
1. Single European Act, opened for signature Feb. 17, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 503 [here-
inafter Single Act].
2. Id. art. 1.
3. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, BULL. EUR. CoMM. No. 6, point
2.4.5 (1987). All 12 member states had to ratify the Single Act before it could enter
into force. Single European Act: A Milestone on the Road Toward European Union, 4
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,812, at 11,886 (Sept. 25, 1986). Anti-Community
campaigners in both Ireland and Denmark forced a referendum prior to the ratification
of the Single Act. Peel, "Single European Act:" Blueprint for Cooperation, EUROPE,
Nov. 1987, at 27. The Single Act originally was to enter into force on January 1, 1987.
Id. The requirement that the Irish amend their constitution to permit ratification, how-
ever, delayed the entry into force of the Single Act. See Irish Constituents to Decide
on Ratification of Single European Act in Referendum, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
10,877, at 12,117-20 (May 7, 1987) (discussing the ruling of the Irish Supreme
Court). The Single Act finally entered into force on July 1, 1987, after the Supreme
Court of Ireland ruled in favor of the Act. Peel, supra, at 27.
4. See Single Act, supra note 1, art. I (stating that the European Community
"shall be founded on the treaties establishing the European Coal and Steel Commu-
nity, the European Economic Community, the European Atomic Energy Community
and on the subsequent treaties and acts modifying or supplementing them").
Three separate organizations comprise the European Community: the European Coal
and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic Community (EEC), and the
European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC). See Treaty Establishing the European
Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 (creating the ECSC);
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty] (creating the EEC); Treaty Establishing the European
Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167 (creating the EAEC).
Common institutions manage all three European Communities. DIRECTORATE-GEN-
ERAL FOR INFORMATION, COMMUNICATION AND CULTURE, COMMISSION OF THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITIES, THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 3 (1986)
[hereinafter INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY] (available at the Delega-
tion of the European Community Library, Washington, D.C.). For the sake of clarity,
this article cites to an unofficial compilation of the Community treaties, B. RUDDEN &
D. WYATT, BASIC COMMUNITY LAWS (2d ed. 1986), which incorporates all appropriate
amendments into each treaty.
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eration in the sphere of foreign policy.5 The Single Act sets forth sev-
eral means of achieving European unity: the establishment of a large
market without internal frontiers by 1992;6 the involvement of the
Community in new fields;7 the creation of a common policy for scien-
tific and technological development;8 the development of a unified eco-
nomic and monetary policy;" a strengthening of economic and social
cohesion; 10 and the coordination of actions relating to the environment
and foreign policy.'
The drafters of the Single Act realized that they had to do two
things to achieve their ambitious goals of European unity. First, they
had to improve the decision-making process to enable the Council of
the European Communities (Council) to make and implement decisions
more rapidly and effectively.12 Second, they had to give the directly
elected European Parliament (Parliament) increased powers in the leg-
5. See Single Act, supra note 1, tit. III (setting forth provisions regarding Euro-
pean cooperation in the sphere of foreign policy).
6. See id. arts. 13-19 (supplementing the EEC Treaty with provisions aimed at the
establishment of an internal European market by 1992); K. BORCHARDT, EUROPEAN
UNIFICATION 31-38 (2d ed. 1986) (describing the interior market that the Community
hopes to achieve by 1992). This interior market will allow free circulation of goods,
free movement of workers and capital, freedom to provide services, and the right of
establishment. Id. at 31. To complete the internal market, member states of the Euro-
pean Community will have to dismantle further all trade barriers; harmonize legisla-
tion, administrative practices, and taxation; and extend cooperation on monetary policy.
Id.
7. See Single Act, supra note 1, arts. 24, 25 (involving the Community, the areas
of research and technological development, and the environment).
8. See id. art. 24 (stating that the Community shall aim to strengthen the scientific
and technological basis of European industry).
9. See id. art. 20 (calling upon EEC member states to cooperate in their economic
and monetary policies).
10. See id. art. 23 (calling upon the Community to develop and pursue actions
leading to more economic and social cohesion).
11. See id. art. 25 (calling upon member states to cooperate in issues involving the
environment and foreign policy). Annexed to the Single Act is a Final Act listing 20
declarations concerning a range of specific subjects that the Presidency, the Commis-
sion, and individual governments made at the Conference of the Representatives of the
Governments of Member States convened in Luxembourg on September 9, 1985. Id. at
23-26. The majority of these declarations relate to various articles of the EEC Treaty
and the Single Act. Id. Other subjects these declarations cover include the Court of
Justice, the powers of implementation of the Commission, the monetary capacity of the
Community, and European political cooperation. Id.
12. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, THIRTY YEARS OF COMMUNITY
LAW 12 (1983) [hereinafter THIRTY YEARS]; see COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COM-
MUNITIES, THE SINGLE ACT: A NEW FRONTIER 9 (1987) [hereinafter THE SINGLE
ACT: A NEW FRONTIER] (stating that the decision-making process of the Community
suffers because the Community often makes tardy and incorrect decisions and is rarely
able to implement these decisions effectively); Weiler, The Genscher-Colombo Draft
European Act: The Politics of Indecision, 6 J. EUR. INTEGRATION 129, 129 (1983)
(stating that a series of crises have plagued decision making in the Community).
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islative process."3 The Single Act, therefore, allows the Council to
make certain decisions by a qualified majority,1" rather than by una-
nimity to speed up the decision-making process.15 In addition, the Sin-
gle Act allows Parliament to assume full responsibility as colegislator
in the "cooperation" procedure to increase the democratic legitimacy of
the Parliament.1 6 Consequently, the institutional modifications of the
Single Act attempt to render the Community more democratic, more
sovereign, and more efficient.1
This article examines the modifications in the decision-making proce-
dure of the Community that the Single Act sets forth. Part I describes
the "institutional triangle" of the European Community, consisting of
the Council, the Commission, and the Parliament (collectively institu-
tions), which is responsible for making Community decisions. Part II
discusses the history of the Single Act. Part III describes the modifica-
tions to the decision-making process and the institutional powers imple-
mented by the Single Act. Finally, Part IV discusses the impact that
the Single Act will have on the institutional structure of the
Community.
I. THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
A. INTRODUCTION
The institutions of the Community are the Council, the Commission,
the Parliament, and the Court of Justice (Court).1 8 The institutional
structure of the Community, however, differs from the tripartite struc-
13. Peel, supra note 3, at 27. The voter turnout for the direct parliamentary elec-
tions has decreased disappointingly from 62% in 1979 to 60% in 1984. Lodge, The
1984 Direct Elections to the European Parliament: A Profile of the Political Forces, 8
J. EUR. INTEGRATION 33, 33 (1984) [hereinafter Lodge I]. The drafters of the Single
Act hoped that giving increased legislative power to the European Parliament would
increase voter confidence and participation in the institution. Interview with Auke
Haagsma, Legal Department, Delegation of the Commission of the European Commu-
nity, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 17, 1987) [hereinafter Interview].
14. See Single Act, supra note 1, art. 148(2) (defining voting by a qualified major-
ity). The Act requires 54 out of a total of 76 votes for the Council to approve a Com-
mission proposal by qualified majority vote. Id. The Federal Republic of Germany,
France, Italy, and the United Kingdom each have 10 votes; Spain has 8 votes; Belgium,
Greece, the Netherlands and Portugal each have 5 votes; Denmark and Ireland each
have 3 votes; and Luxembourg has 2 votes. Id.
15. Single Act, supra note 1, arts. 6-7.
16. Id.
17. INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, supra note 4, at 3.
18. THIRTY YEARS, supra note 12, at 17; see Treaty Establishing the European
Economic Community, arts. 137-208, reprinted in B. RUDDEN & D. WYArr, supra
note 4, at 19 [hereinafter EEC Treaty] (discussing the roles of the various Community
institutions).
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ture of modern democracies because the Community is not a state but
a supranational organization composed of twelve member states.19 Nev-
ertheless, the member states have transferred their own sovereign pow-
ers to the Community institutions in a limited and progressive
.dshion.2 0
The Council, the Commission, and the Parliament together perform
a legislative function.2 1 The Council plays the greatest role in the deci-
sion-making process 22 and is the rough equivalent of a legislative body
in a parliamentary democracy.2 The Commission, which is the execu-
tive body of the Community, also plays an important role in the deci-
24sion-making process. On the other hand, the Parliament, the only
body that the citizens of the Community elect directly, 25 participates in
19. K. BORCHARDT, THE ABC OF COMMUNITY LAW 12 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter
THE ABC OF COMMUNITY LAW]. The current members of the Community, or member
states, include Belgium, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United King-
dom. Id. at 6. The Community is different from a nation because it lacks universal
competence and the power to create new fields of competence. Id. at 12. The Commu-
nity, however, has more power than an international organization because it has sover-
eign rights and an autonomous legal system. Id.; see also COMMISSION OF THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITIES, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S LEGAL SYSTEM II (2d ed. 1984)
(stating that the Community is neither an international organization nor an association
of states but is instead a sovereign association with a legal system independent of the
member states).
The Court of Justice, in Costa v. ENEL, stated that the member states have limited
their sovereign rights within defined fields and created a body of law that binds their
nationals and themselves. Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E. Comm. Ct. J. 585, 593.
20. J. DE RUYT, L'AcTE UNIQUE EUROPtEN 134 (1987); see THE ABC OF COM-
MUNITY LAW, supra note 19, at 10 (stating that the member states have not trans-
ferred full sovereignty to the Community in the areas of defense, diplomacy, education,
and culture).
21. THIRTY YEARS, supra note 12, at 27; see Treaty Establishing a Single Council
and a Single Commission of the European Communities, Apr. 18, 1965, art. 15, re-
printed in B. RUDDEN & D. WYATT, supra note 4, at 83 [hereinafter Merger Treaty]
(stating that the Council and the Commission shall decide their method of cooperation
by common accord). The Court, however, does not participate in the decision-making
process. See EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 164 (asserting that the function of the
Court is to ensure that member states observe the law in their interpretation and appli-
cation of the EEC Treaty).
22. Cf. EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 145 (empowering the Council to make
decisions).
23. THIRTY YEARS, supra note 12, at 27.
24. Id.; THE ABC OF COMMUNITY LAW, supra note 19, at 21.
25. EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 138(3); Act Concerning the Election of the
Representative of the Assembly by Direct Universal Suffrage, Sept. 20, 1976, art. I,
reprinted in B. RUDDEN & D. WYATT, supra note 4, at 133. The Community has held
direct elections only since 1979. Lodge, supra note 13, at 33.
The Parliament has 518 members: 81 each from the Federal Republic of Germany,
Italy, the United Kingdom, and France; 60 from Spain; 25 from the Netherlands; 24
each from Belgium, Greece, and Portugal; 16 from Denmark; 15 from Ireland; and 6
from Luxembourg. EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 138(3).
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the legislative process but does not enjoy all of the powers vested in its
counterpart in a parliamentary democracy. 2
In structuring the Community institutions, the drafters of the Euro-
pean Economic Community Treaty (EEC Treaty) sought to establish a
balance between the powers of the national governments and those of
the Community institutions.2 Consequently, the Council represents the
individual interests of member states,28 the Parliament represents the
citizens of the Community,29 while the Commission defends the inter-
ests of the Community by acting independently of the other Commu-
nity organs in the performance of its duties.30 A more detailed discus-
sion of the functions of the individual institutions under the EEC
Treaty follows. 3'
B. THE COUNCIL
The Council is composed of twelve ministers, one from each member
26. THIRTY YEARS, supra note 12, at 29; see van Schendelen, The European Par-
liament: Political Influence Is More Than Legal Powers, 8 J. EUR. INTEGRATION 59,
59-61 (1984) (stating that the Parliament is different from national parliaments in that
it lacks the political, constitutional, and decision-making powers essential for effective
legislation, budgeting, and exercise of control); see also THE ABC OF COMMUNITY
LAW, supra note 19, at 23-24 (discussing the differences between the European Parlia-
ment and a parliament in a parliamentary democracy). The European Parliament is
different from national parliaments because it does not elect a government. Id. Instead,
the Council and the Commission perform the functions of a government. Id. In this
sense, the Community is an "underdeveloped democracy." Id.
27. E. NOEL, LES ROUAGES DE L'EUROPE 35 (1979).
28. But see THE ABC OF COMMUNITY LAW, supra note 19, at 22 (stating the
Council is at the same time also obliged to take into account the objectives of the
Community as a whole).
29. See EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 137 (stating that the European Parliament
shall consist of representatives of the citizens of the member states); see also THIRTY
YEARS, supra note 12, at 28 (noting that members form political rather than national
groups, vote on an individual and personal basis, and may accept neither instructions
nor a binding mandate from their national government). In 1986, the members of Par-
liament were divided as follows: 172 Socialists, 119 Christian Democrats in the Euro-
pean People's Party, 63 European Democrats, 46 Communists and Allies, 41 members
of the Liberal and Democratic Reformist Group, 34 members of the Group of the
European Renewal and Democratic Alliance, 20 members of the Rainbow Group, 16
members of the European Right, and 7 members belonging to no group. INsTItrnONs
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, supra note 4, at 6.
30. THIRTY YEARS, supra note 12, at 24; see also Merger Treaty, supra note 21,
arL 10(2) (prohibiting members of the Commission from receiving instructions from
national governments or any other body); THE ABC OF COMMUNITY LAW, supra note
19, at 21 (instructing the Commission to endeavor constantly to make the interests of
the Community prevail).
31. This article focuses only on the powers delegated to the institutions under the
EEC Treaty because the modifications of the decision-making process under the Single
Act apply only to the EEC Treaty.
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state.3 2 The Council is responsible for making major policy decisions
for the European Community.3 3 The EEC Treaty limits the power of
the Council, however, because it allows the Council to act solely on
proposals from the Commission. 4 The Council can reach its decisions
either with a simple majority,3 5 a qualified majority,36 or a unanimous
vote.
C. THE COMMISSION
The Commission consists of seventeen members who are chosen on
the grounds of their general competence 8 through a mutual agreement
of Community governments. 9 The Commission must include at least
one, but not more than two, nationals from each member state.40 The
members of the Commission must achieve a majority vote to effect a
decision.4
Article 155 of the EEC Treaty delineates the role of the Commission
in defending Community interests.4 2 The responsibilities of the Com-
32. INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, supra note 4, at 5.
33. See EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 145 (establishing the powers of the Coun-
cil). Article 145 states that the Council shall coordinate the general economic policies
of the member states; possess the power to make decisions; and confer on the Commis-
sion the power to implement the rules that the Council adopts. Id.; see also THIRTY
YEARS, supra note 12, at 21 (indicating that the Permanent Representatives Commit-
tee (Cor~per) assists the Council in finding solutions and reaching agreements on
texts); Merger Treaty, supra note 21, art. 4 (stating that a committee composed of
permanent representatives from the member states shall prepare the work of the Coun-
cil and carry out its assignments). The Cor~per acts as a consulting body to the Coun-
cil and, therefore, the Council is not obligated to adopt its recommendations. THIRTY
YEARS, supra note 12, at 21.
34. EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 149; INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMU-
NITY, supra note 4, at 5; see THIRTY YEARS, supra note 12, at 26 (noting that with few
exceptions the Commission has the right of legislative initiative and that the Council
cannot deliberate until the Commission initiates a formal dialogue).
35. See EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 148 (requiring the Council to act by a
majority vote of its members).
36. See supra note 14 (discussing article 148(2) of the EEC Treaty, which defines
voting by a qualified majority).
37. THIRTY YEARS, supra note 12, at 21. Each provision of the EEC Treaty states
the type of vote that is required for the various decisions of the Council. Compare EEC
Treaty, supra note 4, art. 49 (requiring a vote by a qualified majority for decisions
regarding freedom of movement of workers) with id. art. 235 (requiring a vote by
unanimity for decisions regarding attainment of objectives not specifically contem-
plated by the Treaty).
38. Merger Treaty, supra note 21, art. 10(1).
39. Id. art. 11.
40. Id. art. 10(1). The Commission is presently composed of two British, two
French, two Germans, two Italians, two Spanish, and one citizen from each of the
other member states. INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, supra note 4, at 3.
41. Merger Treaty, supra note 21, art. 17.
42. Id. art. 10(l).
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mission include ensuring the correct implementation of both Commu-
nity treaties and decisions of the Community institutions,4 as well as
proposing to the Council measures that would further the development
of Community policies in the areas of agriculture, energy, industry, re-
search, the environment, social and regional problems, external trade,
and economic and monetary unity.44 In addition, the Commission must
cooperate with the Council in initiating and shaping legislative mea-
sures45 and implementing policies based on Council decisions or EEC
Treaty provisions. 46
D. THE PARLIAMENT
The Parliament 47 is composed of 518 members elected by universal
suffrage.48 The Parliament plays an advisory and supervisory role in the
43. EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 155. In its role as watchdog of the treaties, the
Commission takes action if a member state fails to respect its obligations under the
EEC Treaty. Id. arts. 169, 170; see also id. arts. 93(3), 102(1) (establishing the inves-
tigative powers of the Commission). Moreover, the Commission may impose penalties
and bans on private individuals and corporations if they violate Community laws per-
taining to unfair competition and transport. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 17: First
Regulation Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, 13 J.O. Co.nL. EUR. 205,
arts. 2, 3 (1962), translated in COM1MISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, COMPE-
TITION LAW IN THE EEC AND IN THE ECSC 21 (1986); see EEC Treaty, supra note 4,
arts. 85-94 (discussing the competition policies of the Community). In addition, the
Commission decides whether to invoke the safeguard clauses in the treaties, which call
for a temporary waiver of Community rules in certain circumstances, when member
states request such invocations. Single Act, supra note 1, art. 18 (amending article
100A(4) of the EEC Treaty).
44. See EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 155 (calling upon the Commission to form-
ulate recommendations or opinions in matters the EEC Treaty addressed). Recommen-
dations of the Commission are not binding. Id. art. 189.
45. EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 155; see id. art. 189 (stating that the Council
and the Commission shall issue regulations, recommendations, and directives; make de-
cisions; and deliver opinions); id. art. 149 (describing the "cooperation" process in-
volved in decision making, in which the Council, the Commission, and the Parliament
participate together).
46. EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 155; see Single Act, supra note I, art. 10 (stat-
ing that under the Single Act the Council has the obligation to delegate implementing
power to the Commission). The Council, however, may impose requirements with re-
spect to the exercise of this power by the Commission and also may reserve the right to
exercise implementing powers itself under certain circumstances. Id. Nonetheless, the
Single Act gives to the Commission a greater role than to the Council itself in imple-
menting the decisions of the Council. J. DE RuYT, supra note 20, at 139; see id. (stat-
ing that no internal market can exist unless the Council delegates a considerable
amount of implementing power to the Commission).
47. See THE ABC OF COMMUNITY LAW, supra note 19, at 23 (stating that the
European Parliament appears in the Community treaties under the title "the Assem-
bly"); THIRTY YEARS, supra note 12, at 29 (explaining that the Assembly rechristened
itself "the Parliament" in 1958).
48. INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, supra note 4, at 6.
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Community49 and lacks the legislative powers of national parliaments."0
Nonexclusively, the EEC Treaty empowers the Parliament to dismiss
the Commission with a two-thirds majority vote;51 to supervise Com-
mission programs through oral and written questions;5 2 to oversee
Council programs;53 to participate with the Commission and the Coun-
cil in making decisions regarding certain aspects of the Community;5 4
and to take part in major decisions on Community expenditures.55
II. HISTORY OF THE SINGLE ACT
A. THE LUXEMBOURG COMPROMISE
The Community sought European unity several times prior to the
passage of the Single Act.56 The Community failed to attain European
unity, however, largely because member states were unwilling to trans-
fer their sovereignty to supranational institutions.57 This fear of trans-
ferring power to the Community dates back to the crisis surrounding
the Luxembourg Compromise of 1966.58
Until 1965, the Council made all decisions by unanimous vote. 9 On
June 30, 1965, however, the Council failed to reach unanimity on an
49. EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 137.
50. INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, supra note 4, at 7.
51. EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 144; INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMU-
NITY, supra note 4, at 7. The Parliament can force the Commission to resign.through a
vote of no confidence. THE ABC OF COMMUNITY LAW, supra note 19, at 24. Because
the Parliament has no influence over the new composition of the Commission, however,
in theory, member states could reappoint old Commission members. Id.
52. EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 140; see THE ABC OF COMMUNITY LAW, supra
note 19, at 24 (describing the supervisory powers of the Parliament vis-a-vis the Com-
mission). The Commission must report its actions to the Parliament in an annual re-
port. EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 143; THE ABC OF COMMUNITY LAW, supra note
19, at 24.
53. EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 140.
54. Single Act, supra note 1, arts. 6, 7.
55. EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 203; INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMU-
NITY, supra note 4, at 7-8. The Parliament adopts or rejects the draft budget of the
Commission and the Council and verifies proper execution of the Community budget.
Id; see THE ABC OF COMMUNITY LAW, supra note 19, at 30 (noting that since 1970,
the Parliament has designed the budget with the Council and has had the power to
make amendments regarding noncompulsory expenditures that the Council may not
oppose under certain conditions).
56. De Zwaan, The Single European Act: Conclusion of a Unique Document, 23
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 747, 747 (1986). In October 1972, the European Council an-
nounced in Paris that it intended to achieve European unity by 1980. Id. At another
meeting of the European Council in Paris in December 1974, the heads of state ex-
pressed a desire to improve the operative apparatus of the Council as a step toward
attaining European unity. THIRTY YEARS, supra note 12, at 12.
57. THIRTY YEARS, supra note 12, at 11.
58. J. DE RUYT, supra note 20, at 116.
59. Id.
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issue revolving around the common agricultural policy, and France
claimed that allowing other member states to outvote it would
prejudice its "vital interests."60 As a result, France refused to partici-
pate in Council decisions for seven months.6 ' During this time, the
Council could not make decisions other than those concerning the day-
to-day management of already existing policies.6 2
The Luxembourg Compromise, however, resolved the crisis. Under
its terms, Council members were obliged to make every effort to reach
a "unanimous agreement" on matters that prejudiced the "vital inter-
ests" of one of the member states.63 The Luxembourg Compromise,
however, failed to provide for situations in which member states are
unsuccessful in obtaining unanimity." As a result, unanimity became
the rule for most Council decisions, including decisions on minor mat-
ters not involving national interests.6 5 The requirement of unanimity
led to the inefficiency and uncertainty that the Single Act attempts to
alleviate. The Single Act increases the types of decisions the Council
can make by a qualified majority vote.66
B. IMPACT OF THE LUXEMBOURG COMPROMISE
Voting by a qualified majority in the Council increased gradually
between 1966 and 1984.67 Nonetheless, member states hesitated to in-
stigate actions that would paralyze the Community because of the
Community's traumatic experience leading to the Luxembourg Com-
promise.6 8 As a result, the unanimity requirement hindered the ability
of the Council to make decisions efficiently throughout the 1970s.11
60. THIRTY YEARS, supra note 12, at 5, 22.
61. Id. at 5.
62. Id.
63. The Luxembourg Accords, Jan. 31, 1966, art. 1, 5 I.L.M. 316, 316; TIRTrv
YEARS, supra note 12, at 5, 22. But cf. THE ABC OF COMMUNITY LAw, supra note 19,
at 24 (stating that the Luxembourg Compromise provides no criteria for determination
by the Council whether the "vital interests" of a member state are at stake).
64. See The Luxembourg Accords, supra note 63, art. 3 (stating that a divergence
of views existed on what course to follow if member states fail to reach a complete
agreement).
65. Weiler, supra note 12, at 134.
66. Cf. id. at 134 n.22 (stating that under the Single Act the member states may
not invoke the Luxembourg Compromise if the EEC Treaty specifically calls for a
qualified majority vote).
67. J. DE RuYr, supra note 20, at 116. Between 1966 and 1974, the Council made
between 6 and 10 decisions by qualified majority. Id. Between 1974 and 1979, the
Council made 35 decisions by qualified majority. Id. Between 1980 and 1984, the
Council made 90 decisions by qualified majority. Id.
68. Id. at 13,116.
69. See Single European Act: A Milestone on the Road Toward European Union,
supra note 3, at 11,889 (stating that the large number of decisions prior to the Single
1988]
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Further, Community activity expanded into areas for which the EEC
Treaty failed to define a clear voting policy.7 0 This lack of clarity
forced the Council to make decisions under articles 10071 and 235,71
both of which require unanimity.73
Member states thus increasingly became aware of the necessity to
establish precise, well-defined legal bases in the EEC Treaty to allow
the Council to make more decisions by qualified majority. 4 In addition,
with the admission of Greece to the Community in 198175 and Spain
and Portugal in 1986,' 6 the already cumbersome decision-making pro-
cess risked becoming seriously deadlocked.
C. NEGOTIATION OF THE SINGLE ACT
The direct election of the Parliament in 1979 began a surge toward
European unity that culminated in the implementation of the Single
Act.7 8 At the instigation of Altiero Spinelli79 and with the help of the
Act requiring unanimity constituted a barrier to European unity).
70. J. DE RUYT, supra note 20, at 113.
71. See EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 100 (instructing the Council, when acting
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, to issue directives requiring member
states to enact approximations of such provisions in any national laws, regulations, or
administrative actions that directly affect the establishment or function of the Common
Market).
72. Id. art. 235. Article 235 of the EEC Treaty allows the Council to act in areas
in which the Treaty fails to provide explicitly for the requisite means of action. Id.
These areas include research policy, development policy, environment policy, regional
policy, and food aid policy. J. DE RUYT, supra note 20, at 113.
73. EEC Treaty, supra note 4, arts. 100, 235; cf. J. DE RUYT, supra note 20, at
113 (noting that the Council adopted most of its directives concerning harmonization
of legislation under article 100 of the EEC Treaty and that the obligation of the Coun-
cil always to obtain a unanimous vote under article 100 created one of the main barri-
ers to achieving an internal market).
74. Id. at 114.
75. See Treaty Concerning the Accession of the Hellenic Republic to the European
Economic Community and to the European Atomic Energy Community, May 28,
1979, reprinted in B. RUDDEN & D. WYATT, supra note 4, at 164-65 (admitting
Greece to the EEC and the EAEC).
76. See Treaty Concerning the Accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portu-
guese Republic to the European Economic Community and the European Atomic En-
ergy Community, June 12, 1985, reprinted in B. RUDDEN & D. WYATT, supra note 4,
at 164-65 (admitting Spain and Portugal to the EEC and the EAEC).
77. Peel, supra note 3, at 27.
78. Jacqu6, L'Acte Unique Europ~en, 4 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT
EUROPtEN 575, 575 (1986) [hereinafter Jacqu6 I]; see THIRTY YEARS, supra note 12,
at 28 (stating that prior to 1979 the national parliaments of member states designated
delegates from among their own members to the EEC Parliament).
79. See Jacqu6, The Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union, 22 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 19, 21-22 (1985) (contending that Spinelli first introduced the idea of
drafting a treaty on European unity). Spinelli later served as the rapporteur of the
Committee on Institutional Affairs, which drafted the treaty on European unity. Id. at
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Crocodile Club, 0 the Parliament accepted a Draft Treaty Establishing
the European Union on February 14, 1984.81 In response to the draft
treaty of the Parliament, the European Council, 82 while meeting in
Fontainebleau in June 1984, set up an ad hoc Committee for Institu-
tional Affairs, the purpose of which was to make suggestions to in-
crease European unity. 3 The efforts of the Committee resulted in the
issuance of the Dooge Report in March 1985." The Dooge Report rec-
ommended the establishment of an intergovernmental conference to ne-
gotiate modifications to existing treaties rather than the adoption of a
separate treaty for the implementation of a European Union.88
The European Council discussed the recommendations of the Dooge
Report at a meeting in Milan in 1985.8 Shortly thereafter, in accor-
dance with article 236 of the EEC Treaty,"' the Council convened an
intergovernmental conference in Luxembourg to discuss amending the
22. Spinelli sought to modify the decision-making process of the Community and be-
lieved that only a new treaty could achieve a European union. Id.
80. See id. at 21-22 & n.4 (noting that Spinelli formed a group named the Croco-
dile Club to discuss European unity).
81. Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union, Feb. 14, 1984, reprinted In 27
O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 77/33), at 33 (1984); De Zwaan, supra note 56, at 747.
82. See THIRTY YEARS, supra note 12, at 31 (discussing the role of the European
Council). The European Council, which is not to be confused with the Council of Min-
isters, consists of heads of state and their foreign ministers. Id.; see Merger Treaty,
supra note 21, art. 2 (providing that representatives from each of the member state
governments shall comprise the European Council); THIRTY YEARS, supra note 12, at
31 (discussing the composition and role of the European Council). This body meets at
least three times a year to deal with Community issues and political cooperation. Id. at
31.
83. Lodge, The Single European Act: Towards a New Euro-Dynamism?, 24 J.
COMMON MKT. STUD. 203, 206 (1986). The European Council meeting at Fontaine-
bleau also established a second committee, the Adonnino Committee, to draft title III
of the Single Act, which deals with European cooperation. Id.
84. Glaesner, LActe Unique Europ~en, REVUE DU MARCHE COMMUN, June 1986,
at 308.
85. Id. In proposing modifications to existing treaties, the intergovernmental con-
ference used its own conclusions, the Community patrimony, the Stuttgart Solemn
Declaration on European Unity, and the draft treaty of the European Parliament as
guides. De Zwaan, supra note 56, at 749.
86. De Zwaan, supra note 56, at 749.
87. See EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 236 (enumerating the steps the institutions
must take to amend the EEC Treaty). Article 236 establishes the following steps: (1)
the government of a member state or the Commission submits a proposal to the Coun-
cil; (2) if the Council decides to call an intergovernmental conference after consulting
the Parliament and the Commission, the conference shall be convened by the President
of the Council for determination by common accord the amendments to be made to the
Treaty; (3) the amendments shall enter into force after all member states ratify them.
Id. To initiate the negotiation of the Single Act within the meaning of article 236, the
President of the Council, the government of Luxembourg, submitted a proposal to
amend the EEC Treaty. De Zwaan, supra note 56, at 750. The proposal obtained a
favorable opinion from all three Community institutions. Id.
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treaties of the European Community."8 The Council also established
two committees, one to work on a revision of the EEC Treaty and the
other to draw up a draft of the Treaty on Political Cooperation with a
View to a Common External Security Policy.89 The committees submit-
ted a combined draft treaty90 at the Luxembourg Conference held on
September 9, 1985. 91 At the Luxembourg Conference, all member
states agreed to set down both the amendments to the EEC Treaty, the
ECSC Treaty, the EAEC Treaty, and the Treaty on Political Coopera-
tion between European Countries in a single text called the Single
Act.9 2 The Single Act was opened for signature on February 17, 1986,
at which time Italy, Greece, and Denmark failed to endorse it.93 The
final phase of the signing ceremony took place on February 28, 1986,
when all members signed it.94
III. INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS OF THE SINGLE ACT
A. MECHANICS OF THE "COOPERATION" PROCESS
The Single Act significantly modifies the relationship among the dif-
ferent institutions in the Community through the introduction of the
process of "cooperation" and the qualified majority vote.95 Under the
88. See Glaesner, supra note 84, at 308 (stating that although only seven member
states initially supported holding an intergovernmental conference, all the member
states participated at the Luxembourg Conference).
89. De Zwaan, supra note 56, at 751.
90. See Jacqu6 I, supra note 78, at 587 (noting that this draft treaty did not ad-
dress the question of the Luxembourg Compromise); J. DE RUYT, supra note 20, at
117 (explaining that the five member states that had always opposed repealing the
Luxembourg Compromise changed their opinions and supported the repeal in 1985
when the Federal Republic of Germany tried to invoke its "vital interest" in a negotia-
tion regarding agricultural prices).
91. Cf. De Zwaan, supra note 56, at 752 (indicating that the Parliament played a
consultative role at the Luxembourg Conference, but could not join in the decision).
92. Glaesner, supra note 84, at 308. The member states incorporated the Treaty on
Political Cooperation into the Single Act at the Luxembourg Conference, thereby
bringing political cooperation inside the framework of the EEC Treaty and expanding
the powers of the Community. Interview, supra note 13. Prior to the Single Act, the
EEC Treaty focused on economic, but not political, unity. Id.
93. De Zwaan, supra note 56, at 762.
94. Id.
95. See Jacqu6 I, supra note 78, at 590 (asserting that decision making by "cooper-
ation" applies to most situations in which the Council may rule by qualified majority).
Instances exist, however, in which the Single Act provides only for a qualified majority
vote, thereby excluding the "cooperation" procedure. Id. See J. DE RUYT, supra note
20, at 126 (arguing that the "cooperation" procedure does not apply to decisions taken
by a qualified majority in certain areas). These exceptions include alteration of customs
tariffs under article 28; nonapplicability of the EEC Treaty to certain activities under
article 55; abolition of restrictions on freedom to provide services under articles 59 and
63; issuance of directives for abolition of restrictions on the movement of capital under
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"cooperation" procedure, the Commission makes a proposal and the
Parliament gives its opinion on the proposal.9 6 Subsequently. the Coun-
cil adopts a "common position" with respect to the proposal of the
Commission.97 If the Council adopts the proposal of the Commission, it
may do so by a qualified majority vote. 3 Conversely, if the Council
wishes to modify the proposal, it must do so by unanimous vote.90
The Council next communicates its "common position" to the Parlia-
ment.10 The Commission also gives the Parliament its opinion on the
"common position" of the Council.10' If the Parliament does not act
within three months, or if it approves the "common position,"102 the
Council must adopt the act in question according to the "common
position."103
Alternatively, within this same three-month period, the Parliament
may still amend or reject the "common position" of the Council.'"
Even if the Parliament chooses to reject the "common position," the
Council may adopt it on a "second reading" with a unanimous vote. 0 5
If the Parliament amends the "common position," however, the Council
may not deliberate directly on the amendments."0" Rather, the Com-
mission serves as a "filter," 0 7 reexamining the "common position" of
article 69; coordination of the exchange policies of member states with respect to the
movement of capital under article 70(1); exchange restrictions on the movement of
capital under article 75(1); and transportation under article 84. Jacqu6 1, supra note
78, at 590. The "cooperation" procedure also does not apply to the environmental area.
Id.
96. Single Act, supra note 1, art. 7(2)(a).
97. Id.; cf. Jacqu6 I, supra note 78, at 591 (noting that the Single Act does not
provide the Council with a time frame in which to issue its "common position").
98. Single Act, supra note I, art. 7(2)(a); Jacqu6 I, supra note 78, at 591.
99. Single Act, supra note 1, art. 7(2)(c); see also J. DE RUYT, supra note 20, at
128 (indicating that the Single Act retains the rule of the EEC Treaty that requires
the Council to act unanimously if it amends a proposal of the Commission).
100. Single Act, supra note 1, art. 7(2)(b).
101. Id.
102. See Jacqu6 I, supra note 78, at 591 (asserting that the Parliament may ap-
prove the "common position" by a simple majority because the Single Act specifies no
particular voting method).
103. Id.
104. Single Act, supra note 1, art. 7(2)(c). The Parliament may amend or modify
the decisions of the Council by absolute majority. Id.
105. Id.; see id. art. 7(2)(f) (stating that the Council must conduct its "second
reading" of the "common position" within three months).
106. Glaesner, supra note 84, at 320; see Single Act, supra note 1, art. 7(2)(d)(requiring the Commission to reexamine the proposal while taking into account the
amendments that the Parliament offers).
107. Interview, supra note 13 (explaining that the Council may not debate directly
on the amendments offered by the Parliament because the Commission is the only insti-
tution that can issue proposals).
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the Council along with the proposed amendments of the Parliament 0 8
and forwarding this reexamined proposal to the Council with the
amendments of the Parliament that it rejected. 109 The Council may
adopt the reexamined proposal by qualified majority,110 but it needs a
unanimous vote to adopt the amendments of the Parliament that the
Commission rejected."1 If the Council wishes to amend the reexamined
proposal of the Commission, it also needs a unanimous vote.112 In any
event, the Single Act sets forth a three-month period within which the
Council must act on the Commission's reexamined proposal and the
Parliment's amendments.1 13 Insofar as the Council has not acted dur-
ing that time, however, the Commission may alter its proposal at any
time.11 4
B. THE SCOPE OF INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS
The qualified majority vote and the "cooperation" process described
in article 7 of the Single Act does not extend to all legislative activity
of the Community. 1 5 For example, the Single Act does not affect deci-
sions made under the ECSC Treaty and the EAEC Treaty." 8
Article 6 of the Single Act lists the provisions of the EEC Treaty to
which the "cooperation" procedure does apply. 17 These provisions in-
clude article 7, which focuses on discrimination based on nationality;
article 49, which provides for the freedom of movement of workers; and
articles 54(2), 56(2), and 57, which authorize the freedom of establish-
ment. 1 ' The "cooperation" procedure also extends to a large number
of new articles that the Single Act added to the EEC Treaty. These
new provisions include article 10OA119 and 100B, 2 ° which discuss the
108. But see Glaesner, supra note 84, at 320 (noting that the Commission cannot
reexamine its position if the Parliament either approved the "common position" of the
Council or rejected it instead of proposing amendments).
109. Id.
110. Single Act, supra note 1, art. 7(2)(e).
111. Id. art. 7(2)(d).
112. Id. art. 7(2)(e).
113. Id. art. 7(2)(f); cf. J. DE RuYT, supra note 20, at 132 (stating that the failure
of the Council to act on the proposal of the Commission does not permit either the
Commission or the Parliament to prevail).
114. Single Act, supra note 1, art. 7(3).
115. J. DE RUYT, supra note 20, at 127.
116. Id.
117. Single Act, supra note 1, art. 6(1)-(7).
118. Id.
119. Id. art. 18; see Peel, supra note 3, at 28 (asserting that article 100A is the key
reform implementing the decision to abolish internal trade barriers and to create an
internal market). The Single Act provides for a qualified majority vote in all areas
involving the creation of an internal market, with the exception of the harmonization of
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approximation and harmonization of laws; 2' article 118A, which ad-
dresses improvements in work environments; 2 2 article 130E, which fo-
cuses on implementation of decisions relating to the European Regional
Development Fund;1 23 and article 130Q(2), which discusses research
and technological development.124
C. THE IMPACT OF INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS
Although the amendments to the EEC Treaty incorporated in the
Single Act125 render the decision-making process more complex by ad-
ding a "second reading" to article 149, they also make the EEC Treaty
more democratic. The "first reading" of the Council under the Single
Act remains unaltered from the "first reading" under the unamended
EEC Treaty. Instead of ending in a decision, however, the "first read-
ing" in the Single Act ends in the adoption of a "common position"
which then goes through a "second reading."1 26 By adding this "second
reading" the Single Act gives the Parliament more power vis-a-vis the
Council without upsetting the subtle balance among the institutions.Y7
Prior to the Single Act, the EEC Treaty limited the Parliament to a
consultative role in creating Community legislation. 8
tax laws. Id. at 30.
120. Single Act, supra note 1, art. 19.
121. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, EUROPE WITHOUT FRON-
TIERS - COMPLETING THE INTERNAL MARKET 38 (1987) [hereinafter EUROPE WITH-
our FRONTIERS - COMPLETING THE INTERNAL MARKET] (stating that the approxima-
tion and harmonization of laws involves the adjustment of national legislation to
conform to a uniform Community standard). Harmonization of laws eliminates trade
barriers and provides for a freer movement of goods, persons, services, and capital. See
id. at 38-39 (discussing the positive effects of the harmonization of laws by member
states). The Single Act also amends the EEC Treaty to note generally that "the inter-
nal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the free move-
ment of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured." Single Act, supra note 1, art.
13.
122. Single Act, supra note 1, art. 21.
123. Id.
124. Single Act, supra note 1, art. 24; see also id. art. 25 (amending the EEC
Treaty to require the Council to define all environmental matters that require decisions
by a qualified majority); Glaesner, supra note 84, at 320 (stating that the drafters of
the Single Act did not want to broaden the powers of Parliament to cover the move-
ment of capital, sea and air navigation, and commercial policies).
125. Glaesner, supra note 84, at 320.
126. Id.
127. J. DE RuYT, supra note 20, at 133.
128. Id. at 121. The Single Act increased the consultation powers of the Parlia-
ment. Id. The Act grants consultation powers to the Parliament in articles 99, 130D,
130Q, and 130S of the EEC Treaty. Single Act, supra note 1, arts. 17, 23-25; Jacqu6
I, supra note 78, at 590 n.22. The Single Act also extends the consultation powers of
the Parliament to new decisions concerning the Court. Single Act, supra note 1, art.
27; J. DE RuYr, supra note 20, at 124.
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In the same fashion, the Single Act introduces voting by qualified
majority in a larger number of areas, which also augments the power of
the Commission in relation to the Council.129 Originally, the EEC
Treaty required the Council to make many important decisions by
unanimous vote.130 This requirement made it difficult for the Commis-
sion to persuade the Council to adopt its proposals.1 31 Because the Sin-
gle Act allows voting by a qualified majority in many more situations,
the Single Act facilitates the acceptance of the proposals of the Com-
mission by the Council. 32
IV. ACHIEVING EUROPEAN UNITY: FORECASTING THE
CHANCES OF SUCCESS FOR THE SINGLE ACT
The underlying purpose of the Single Act is to quicken and democra-
tize the decision-making process of the Community, thereby promoting
European unity and achieving an entirely internal market by 1992.133
In addition, through the increased participation of the directly elected
Parliament in the legislative process, the drafters of the Single Act
sought to encourage public awareness of, and support for, the Commu-
nity.3 If the Community citizenry is aware that a directly-elected and
influential Parliament is meaningfully engaged in a legislative process
Articles 8 and 9 of the Single Act also give the power of "co-decision" to the Parlia-
ment regarding new memberships in the Community and negotiation of agreements of
association. Single Act, supra note 1, arts. 8, 9. Article 8 provides that the Council
shall act unanimously after consulting the Commission and after receiving the majority
consent of the Parliament when considering the admission of a new European state to
the Community. Id. art. 8. The same process applies in concluding agreements between
the Community and a third state. Id. art. 9. Prior to the Single Act, the Parliament
simply played a consultative role in membership and association agreements. J. DE
RuYT, supra note 20, at 123.
In September 1987, the Parliament, already exercising this new power of "co-deci-
sion" under the Single Act, voted to include the new member states of Spain and Por-
tugal in the association agreements with North Africa. Peel, supra note 3, at 30. The
Parliament will undoubtedly play a major role in deciding on the application of Turkey
for membership to the Community. Id. The Parliament is trying to expand even further
its "co-decision" powers under article 238 to enable it to participate in the ratification
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Interview, supra note 13.
129. J. DE RUYT, supra note 20, at 133.
130. See EUROPE WITHOUT FRONTIERS - COMPLETING THE INTERNAL MARKET,
supra note 121, at 22-23 (noting that the Single Act replaces the unanimity require-
ment under the EEC Treaty with decisions by qualified majority in areas relating to
the establishment and functioning of the internal market).
131. Id. at 23.
132. Jacqu6 I, supra note 78, at 590.
133. Id. at 586-87.
134. Cf. id. at 587 (stating that the drafters of the Single Act intended the in-
creased participation of the Parliament in the legislative process to increase the democ-
ratization of the Community).
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that affects their lives, the Community will become more powerful, sov-
ereign, and unified. 135 Despite this result, one leading commentator is
skeptical as to whether the institutional modifications of the Single Act
will bring about the desired changes.13 The concerns of this commen-
tator are worthy of discussion.
A. BARRIERS TO EUROPEAN UNITY
1. The "Cooperation" Procedure May Slow Down the Decision-Mak-
ing Process
The Community institutions could easily abuse and immobilize the
decision-making process that the Single Act establishes in article 7.
First, because the Single Act does not provide a time limit within
which the Council must issue its "common position," the Council could
stall the decision-making process through inaction.137 Additionally, if a
member state asserts that it has a "vital interest" at stake under the
Luxembourg Compromise, it could block the ability of the Council to
make a decision. 38
Second, the Parliament could also inhibit the decision-making pro-
cess. Although the Council adopts a "common position" by qualified
majority vote,139 it must attain unanimity to adopt that "common posi-
tion" on a "second reading" if the Parliament rejects it.140 It is unlikely
that a member state, if it were in the minority that voted negatively on
the first vote of the Council, would change its negative vote on a "sec-
ond reading" if it had the support of the Parliament.141 Member states
could also change their position on the "common position" after the
Parliament rejects it and further hinder its adoption. 42 The power of
rejection of the Parliament, therefore, is significant. If the Parliament
uses this power in an irresponsible manner to pursue parochial inter-
ests, it could slow down the decision-making process considerably 43
Third, the Commission also has the power to block the decision-mak-
ing process if it fails to respect the time limits that the Single Act
135. Id. at 586.
136. See J. DE RuYT, supra note 20, at 133-37 (describing potential shortcomings
of the "cooperation" procedure).
137. Jacqu6 I, supra note 78, at 591.
138. Id.
139. Single Act, supra note 1, art. 7(2)(a).
140. Id. art. 7(2)(c).
141. J. DE RuYT, supra note 20, at 137.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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imposes.144 Although the Single Act requires the Commission to re-
examine the amendments the Parliament proposes within a one-month
period, 45 it fails to establish sanctions against the Commission for non-
compliance with that deadline. 14 6 Moreover, the Council may only
make a "second reading" after the Commission has acted on the "com-
mon position."' 47 Consequently, dilatory tactics by the Commission
could potentially block the "second reading" of the Council.
2. The "Cooperation" Procedure Could Politicize the Decision-Mak-
ing Process
The introduction of a "second reading" and the augmentation of the
role of the Parliament in the Single Act could seriously "politicize" the
decision-making process.148 Because Parliament uses a majority vote
system, coalitions of interests will form. 49 Furthermore, these interest
groups will undoubtedly seek to influence the other institutions.150 First,
it could conceivably pressure the member states of the Council to in-
voke "vital interests." Second, because the Parliament controls the
budget, it could also coerce the Commission to adopt its proposed
amendments. 5' Finally, the Parliament has the power to force the res-
ignation of the Commission.' 52
The increased situations in which voting by qualified majority can
occur under the Single Act could also result in the creation of interest
groups within the Council. 5 3 For example, Greece, Portugal, and Spain
could block a vote by qualified majority by combining their twenty-one
votes.154 This type of pressure could create a politicized atmosphere in
which the institutions and member states exchange favors.' 55
144. Glaesner, supra note 84, at 321.
145. Single Act, supra note 1, art. 7(2)(d).
146. But see Glaesner, supra note 84, at 321 (stating that the Community could
interpret article 144 or article 175 of the EEC Treaty to provide for sanctions against
the Commission).
147. Single Act, supra note 1, art. 7(2)(d).
148. J. DE RuYT, supra note 20, at 138.
149. Jacqu6 I, supra note 78, at 593.
150. Id.
151. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (describing the power of the Parlia-
ment with regard to the budget); Interview, supra note 13 (stating that, in theory, the
Parliament can censure the Council through its budgetary powers, but that to date, the
Parliament has never-exercised this power).
152. EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 144; J. DE RUYT, supra note 20, at 138.
153. Glaesner, supra note 84, at 312.
154. Id.
155. van Schendelen, supra note 26, at 67. Members of Parliament have at their
disposal many networks and contacts that they can use to achieve political ends. Id.;
see id. at 68 (discussing the reputation of the Parliament for exerting influence over
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Such a politicized atmosphere could jeopardize the independence of
the Commission,156 make it difficult for the Council and the Commis-
sion to carry out their mandates, and render the decision-making pro-
cess less effective. Under the "cooperation" procedure, the institutions
may find that instead of acting within their designated roles, they are
granting reciprocal favors to avoid deadlocks and difficulties."6 7
The Commission may assume the role of a mediator if the decision-
making process becomes politicized." 8 If the Single Act is to succeed,
the Commission must take this role seriously and always remain com-
mitted to acting in the best interests of the Community. For example,
when adopting the re-examined proposal, the Commission should be
hesitant to embrace amendments offered by the Parliament that are
unpopular with the Council. Behaving otherwise could immobilize the
decision-making process: if the Council rejects the re-examined position
of the Commission, it must obtain a unanimous vote to adopt any other
position.1 59 Achieving this unanimity may prove difficult or impossible.
If the Commission rejects certain parliamentary amendments, however,
the Parliament could become retaliatory or uncooperative.
3. The Single Act Fails to Resolve the Question of the Luxembourg
Compromise
Although the Luxembourg Compromise does not have a legal basis,
with the implementation of the Single Act, it is uncertain whether a
member state can still invoke a "vital interest" to block the decision-
making process.21 0 One commentator has argued that the "coopera-
tion" process of the Single Act overturns the Luxembourg Compro-
mise.161 No provision in the Single Act, however, explicitly prohibits a
member state from invoking a "vital interest."16 2 Voting by qualified
decisions).
156. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (noting that the Commission must
act independently and in the best interest of the Community).
157. van Schendelen, supra note 26, at 71.
158. Peel, supra note 3, at 30.
159. See Single Act, supra note 1, arts. 7(1), 7(2)(e) (requiring a unanimous vote
in the Council to amend the re-examined proposal of the Commission).
As long as the Council has not acted, the Commission may modify its position and
propose a compromise capable of reuniting a qualified majority, although at the price
of sacrificing the amendments of the Parliament. Id. art. 7(3). The Commission, how-
ever, in exercising this prerogative, must avoid censuring the Parliment and depriving it
of its power. Id.
160. Jacqu6 I, supra note 78, at 588.
161. Id.
162. But see id. at 599 (arguing that the addition of the safeguard clause to the
Single Act by the drafters indicates their rejection of the Luxembourg Compromise
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majority, therefore, may become very inefficient if a member state as-
serts an essential national interest and thereby prevents the Council
from making decisions.
4. Member States May Circumvent the Requirement of a Qualified
Majority Vote in Certain Decisions
The Single Act introduces legal bases for making decisions in areas
that article 235 of the EEC Treaty traditionally addressed. 163 The Sin-
gle Act implements the procedures of "cooperation" and vote by a
qualified majority for most of these new areas.' 6 To circumvent the
requirement of a qualified majority vote, however, member states reluc-
tant to adopt a position and the Council may rely on other articles of
the EEC Treaty that mandate a unanimous vote. Conversely, if the
EEC Treaty requires unanimity in a certain area, the Commission and
the Parliament may try to make decisions under the articles of the
EEC Treaty that permit voting by a qualified majority. In such situa-
tions, the Court would need to decide whether the legal bases that the
Council is proposing are acceptable. 165 For example, article 99 of the
Single Act requires unanimous decisions in the area of harmonization
of tax laws. 66 The Institutional Committee of the Parliament, however,
in seeking to expand the Single Act to the broadest extent possible,
argues that the institutions should make tax decisions under article
100A, which calls for a qualified majority vote on issues involving the
harmonization of laws.' 67
This type of expansion contradicts the clear language of both the
Single Act and the EEC Treaty and alters the role of the Commission
in the decision-making process. 16 Such confusion regarding the correct
legal basis for Council decisions will significantly impair the decision-
because the safeguard provisions would be unnecessary if the Luxembourg Compromise
were still in effect). See generally infra notes 182-85 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing safeguard provisions).
163. De Zwaan, supra note 56, at 763-64. Examples of areas covered by article
235 are technology and the environment. Id.; see supra note 72-73 and accompanying
text (describing article 235 and noting that it requires unanimity).
164. See Single Act, supra note 1, arts. 21, 24 (providing that the "cooperation"
procedure shall apply to decisions concerning research, technological development, and
social policy).
165. See EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 164 (stating that the Court of Justice
ensures the correct legal interpretation of the EEC Treaty).
166. Single Act, supra note I, art. 17.
167. Id. art. 18; Interview, supra note 13.
168. See supra notes 127-32 and accompanying text (describing how the role of the
Commission in the decision-making process varies depending on whether a decision is
taken by qualified majority or by unanimity).
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making process69
In Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the Eu-
ropean Communities170 the Court admonished the Council for circum-
venting the requirement of making certain decisions by qualified major-
ity. The Council, acting on a Commission proposal, adopted regulations
that suspended customs duties, either completely or subject to Commu-
nity quotas or ceilings, on a number of products from developing coun-
tries.'1 1 The regulations that the Council adopted, however, differed in
substance from those proposed by the Commission. 172 In addition, the
Council failed to cite a legal basis for issuing these suspensions. 73
The Commission claimed that article 113 of the EEC Treaty, which
requires a qualified majority vote, 7 4 was the only possible legal basis
for adopting the requirements . 75 The Council, however, argued that
article 113 was not the sole legal basis for the regulations 170 and that it
could also rely on article 235, which requires a unanimous vote.177 The
Commission responded that recourse to article 235 was unfair because
the Council had a greater possibility of accepting the proposals of the
Commission under article 113.118 The Commission, therefore, asked the
Court to cancel the regulations, claiming that the incorrect legal basis
for the action of the Council significantly undermined the powers of the
169. J. DE RUYT, supra note 20, at 134.
170. Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European Com-
munities, Case No. 45/86 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 14,421 (Mar. 26, 1987).
171. Opinion of the Advocate General, Case No. 45/86, at 3 (Jan. 29, 1987)
[hereinafter Opinion] (available at the European Community Delegation Library,
Washington, D.C.).
172. Id. 113.
173. Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European Com-
munities, Case No. 45/86, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 14,421, at 17,943 (Mar. 26,
1987). The preamble of the regulations contains only the phrase "having regard to the
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community." Opinion, supra note 171, 11
11; see EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 190 (requiring the Council and the Commission
to state the basis of their regulations).
174. See EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 113 (covering common commercial poli-
cies and tariffs).
175. Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European Com-
munities, Case No. 45/86, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 14,421, at 17,941 (Mar. 26,
1987).
176. Id. at 17,944. The Council believed that it could not rely solely on article 113
but that it also needed recourse to article 235 because the decision involved develop-
ment policy as well as commercial policy. Id.
177. EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 235; see supra notes 67, 154 and accompany-
ing text (describing the provisions contained in article 235); see Opinion, supra note
171, 1 22 (explaining that when the Council adopted the wording "having regard to the
Treaty" it was referring to the provisions of articles 113 and 235 of the EEC Treaty).
178. Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European Com-
munities, Case No. 45/86, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 14,421, at 17,944 (Mar. 26,
1987).
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The Court concluded that the Council had substantially violated the
EEC Treaty. In reaching this decision, the Court noted that the Coun-
cil could resort to article 235 only if other provisions of the Treaty did
not confer the necessary competence to make a decision. 18' The Court
would not excuse the Council from using article 113 to make a decision
simply because the regulation only tangentially involved development
policy. 81
5. Member States May Rely on the Safeguard Provisions of the Sin-
gle Act to Circumvent Decisions Taken by a Qualified Majority Vote
The member states may rely too heavily on the safeguard provisions
of the Single Act 182 and thereby circumvent the implementation of
Council decisions taken by qualified majority vote. These provisions,
which are set forth in article 18, provide that member states can re-
ceive an exemption from implementing a decision made by a qualified
majority under article 100A of the EEC Treaty. 83 To obtain this ob-
jective, member states must demonstrate "major needs"' 84 or prove
that their divergent national legislation is not a discriminatory measure
or a disguised restriction on trade.185
Denmark has already used these safeguard provisions to maintain
higher standards for environmental protection. 88 Prior to the Single
Act, Denmark blocked a proposal to implement common standards for
exhaust fumes in the Community, claiming that the proposed standards
were too lax. 87 Denmark relied on the rule of unanimity under article
100A of the EEC Treaty to defeat the proposal. The Single Act, how-
ever, amends the EEC Treaty to permit the Council to make these
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 17,944-45.
182. See Single Act, supra note 1, art. 18 (setting forth the safeguard provisions
that allow the member states to take provisional measures).
183. Id.
184. See EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 36 (listing "major needs" such as public
morality, public policy, public security, and the protection of human life and health);
see also Glaesner, supra note 84, at 312 (noting that the Single Act contains safeguard
provisions because the drafters recognized that in establishing the internal market,
some of the adopted measures would have serious consequences for less developed
countries); Peel, supra note 3, at 30 (stating that Denmark, Ireland, and the United
Kingdom insisted on the addition of safeguard provisions to the Single Act to protect
national laws on health, safety, and environmental and consumer protection).
185. EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 36.
186. Peel, supra note 3, at 30.
187. Id.
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types of decisions by qualified majority.18 Thus, after the Community
enacted the Single Act, Denmark allowed the other member states to
outvote it.189 Denmark, nevertheless, indicated that it planned to apply
stricter standards than other Community member states.18 0 In the fu-
ture, the Court will have to confront the task of deciding whether the
newly adopted article 10OA(4) embodied in article 18 of the Single Act
permits member states to engage in independent activity or whether
such activity constitutes a barrier to a free market."0 '
CONCLUSION
Although it is as yet uncertain whether the institutional modifica-
tions of the Single Act will make the decision-making process of the
Community more efficient or democratic, the final evaluation is pessi-
mistic. The goals that the institutional changes of the Single Act en-
deavor to achieve, democracy and efficiency, conflict. The Single Act,
therefore, will not help Europe to achieve a unified internal market by
1992.
Although a qualified majority vote may enhance the decision-making
process, the Single Act sacrifices efficiency by instituting the cumber-
some "second reading" as part of the "cooperation" process. Further,
European citizens may not fully appreciate the drafters' efforts to make
the Parliament more democratic. Low election turnouts918 manifest the
citizens' relative indifference to the Parliament. Moreover, the "cooper-
ation" process is unlikely to make Europeans consider the members of
Parliament as their true representatives in matters of great signifi-
cance.193 Rather, the increased participation of the Parliament in deci-
sion-making is likely to have a negative effect, resulting in the pursuit
of more parochial interests by parliamentarians, an excessive politiciza-
tion of the process, and an increased difficulty in reaching consensus.
In addition, the Single Act is weak because it fails to abolish irrefut-
ably the Luxembourg Compromise, to provide for appropriate dead-
lines and penalties in certain areas of the "cooperation" process, and to
limit the use of safeguard provisions. Without concessions in these ar-
eas, however, the member states would not have ratified the Single Act.
188. Single Act, supra note 1, art. 18.
189. Peel, supra note 3, at 30.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See Lodge I, supra note 13, at 33 (discussing the low voter turnout for the
elections of the Parliament).
193. See id. (stating that upon his election to the Parliament, Pierre Pflimlin com-
mented on the Europeans' "abysses of ignorance" over the Parliament).
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Because the institutions can do little to correct these weaknesses now, it
is crucial that they strive to avoid deadlock, give high priority to Com-
munity interests, and avoid resorting to the loopholes of the Single Act.
For example, member states should avoid invoking "vital interests"
and the Council should not make decisions under legal bases not explic-
itly stated in the EEC Treaty as amended by the Single Act. The
Council and the Commission should act within a reasonable amount of
time, even if the Single Act does not manifestly embody a deadline.
Before engaging in a "second reading" or taking a "common position,"
each institution should consider the reaction of the other institutions. If
one institution deliberately makes an objectionable decision, the deci-
sion-making process may become immobilized. Although the Single
Act has neither the clarity nor the internal policing mechanisms neces-
sary to make the decision-making process run smoothly, the institutions
can avoid deadlock through the exercise of discipline and good faith.
